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NoTFs AN CommENrs
it if a clear guide is furnished the trier of facts than if an unintel-
ligible and confusing guide is given to them.
Therefore, the following suggestive basic instructions are sub-
mitted to serve as a means of informing the jury in plain terms as to
what is expected and required of them.
Ordinary civil case-"The court instructs the jury that if you be-
lieve that the evidence shows a greater probability of truth than of
falsity you must find for the offeror."
Unusual Civil Case-"The court instructs the jury that if you be-
lieve that the evidence shows so much greater probability of truth
than of falsity that a reasonable man would be convinced of its truth
you must find for the offeror."
Criminal cases-"The court instructs the jury that if you believe
that the evidence is so convincing that a reasonable man would not
doubt it you must find for the offeror."
These instructions can be easily adapted to fit the facts of each
particular case and thus inform the jury in plain terms as to the degree
of belief without the use of rhetorical and flowery language. It is be-
lieved that such instructions if used would eliminate much of the con-
fusion that exists in the jurors minds after listening to the instructions
given them.
JoN W. MunrY, JR.
ADOPTION-REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT OF NATURAL
PARENT
The typical attitude of courts today with regard to the necessity
for parental consent to the adoption of a child and the importance at-
tached to such consent is illustrated by the recent Arkansas case of
Woodson v. Lee." In construing the Arkansas statute,2 which requires
child for six months next preceding the filing of the petition for
adoption, the court held that the evidence failed to disclose such an
abandonment by the father as to preclude the need for his consent.
Previously a divorce decree had given the mother custody and re-
sponsibility for the maintenance and upkeep of the child during
minority with rights of visitation given to the father. The father had
written consent of living parents unless the parent has abandoned the
visited his son every two weeks until sometime before the petition for
1 254 S.W. 2d 326 (Ark. 1953).
'ARK. STATS. sec. 56-106 (a), (b) (I) (1947).
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adoption by the child's maternal grandparents. The evidence indicated
that the only reasons for discontinuing the visits were the attitude of
the former wife, including her attempts to prevent the visits, and the
advice of the father's attorney who was engaged to preserve his rights
of visitation. In view of these circumstances, the requisite intention
to abandon the child permanently to the care of others was not
shown; 3 therefore, the consent of the father was necessary because
he had done nothing to negative the need for consent.
It has been said that one of the greatest responsibilities of a court
is that of determining the proper custodian of a child. It seems that
this field of the law is unsuited to the use of fixed maxims, rather the
courts should weigh all of the individual and social interests involved.4
Under the common law of England, the rights of the father with re-
gard to custody of minor children were almost unlimited, with little
concern for the rights of the mother or the interests of the child.
Although the courts had the power to remove a child from the
custody of its parents under certain circumstances, this was rarely
done, the right of the father to custody being considered almost
proprietary.5
The view regarding custody has been largely changed by legisla-
tion and by decisions of courts of equity making the rights of both
parents more nearly equal, but these rights have been made secondary
to the welfare of the child. The state, as parens patria, may make any
reasonable regulation governing the custody of infants.0 Statutes in
the fifty-one American jurisdictions expressly grant courts the power
to deprive both parents of custody under certain circumstances.7
After recognizing that courts have the power to remove children
from the custody of parents who have forfeited their rights to such
custody, the question arises as to when courts can go one step further
' The court quotes from 2 C. J. S. 388 (1936):
"'Ordinarily abandonment by a parent, to justify in law the adoption of his
child by a stranger without his consent, is conduct which evinces a settled pur-
pose to forgo all parental duties continued for a prescribed period of time when
the statute so provides. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undis-
turbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment ....
See also In re Cordy, 169 Cal. 150, 146 Pac. 532 (1914).
'Note, 28 N. C. L. 1Ev. 323 (1950).
'4 VERNmR, AimcAN FAmILY LAWS 17, 19 (1936); MADDEN, HANDnOOK
ON =HE LAW OF PERSONS AND DoarEsTac RELATIONS 369-370 (1931).
043 C. J. S. 50, 55 (1945); MADDEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS
AND DolmsTic RELATIONS 374 (1931). (Wherein Madden states that some courts
have gone so far as to say that the father has a right to custody, not because of an
absolute right, but because such custody is for the benefit of the infant as a legal
presumption.)
'VERNIEm, op. cit. Supra, note 5 at 19. Common instances where custody is
denied to the parents exist where abandonment, neglect, cruel treatment, etc.
cause the parental rights to be forfeited,
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and permit adoption of children without parental consent and even
over parental objection. The mere fact that a parent has been de-
prived of or does not have custody of the child is not alone sufficient
to dispense with the necessity for his consent.8 The relationship
created by adoption was unknown at common law. Since its regula-
tion is wholly by statute the statutory provisions in different jurisdic-
tions must be closely examined, especially those dealing with consent
to adoption, the fundamental element at the heart of the adoption
concept. Under ordinary circumstances, in all but four jurisdictions
(Florida, Maryland, South Carolina, and Tennessee), the consent of
the natural parents of a child to be adopted is required by statute.10
However, as Vernier so ably points out, exceptions to the rule are
rather numerous and vary with the particular jurisdiction inaking it
often extremely difficult to determine legislative intent regarding neces-
sity for parental consent under certain circumstances."
When parents are guilty of certain classes of misconduct statutes
commonly permit adoption without consent of a child's parent or
parents. Exceptions (approximately stated) to the general rule requir-
ing consent occur where the court finds abandonment (26 jurisdic-
tions); desertion or neglect (15 jurisdictions); deprivation of custody,
guardianship, or parental rights by judicial decree (23 jurisdictions);
loss of guardianship in divorce proceedings (7 jurisdictions); and in
cases where divorce has been granted because of adultery, cruelty,'1 2
abandonment, nevertheless or desertion (6 jurisdictions); and habitual
drunkenness (14 jurisdictions).13
Even in the jurisdictions where loss of custody, guardianship, or
parental rights by judicial decree deprives a parent of his right to
'The rule is perhaps different in Iowa. See In re Chinn's Adoption, 238 Iowa
4, 25 N.W. 2d 735 (1947); In re Adoption of Karns, 236 Iowa 932, 20 N.W. 2d
474 (1945); In re Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 931, 14 N.W. 2d 742 (1944); also
see VERNIER, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 341; note, 33 IowA L. REV. 678 (1948).
'In re Thome's Estate, 155 N.Y. 140, 49 N.E. 661 (1898). MADDEN, HAD-
nOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND Do~fEsTic RELATIONS, 854 (1931). (There he
defines adoption as "the act by which the relations of paternity and affiliation are
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature.")
'0 VERNI, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 340.
, In some cases consent of the parents has been considered a prerequisite to
jurisdiction of the court with regard to adoption. Willis v. Bell, 86 Ark. 473, 111
S.W. 808 (1908); Furgeson v. Jones, 17 Or. 204, 20 Pac. 842 (1888); In re Mc-
Cormick's Estate, 108 Wis. 234, 84 N.W. 148 (1900).
'See CAL. CIV. CODE, sec. 224 (Deering, 1949). See also In re Cozza, 163
Cal. 514, 126 Pac. 161 (1912) where, although the statute in question negatives
necessity for consent of a parent adjudged guilty of cruelty and divorced on such
ground, the court held that the consent of the mother to an adoption was es-
,sential even though she had been guilty of cruelty with regard to her husband,
but where the court nevertheless had seen fit to give her custody in the decree of
divorce.
'See VERNIER, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 341 et seq. for an excellent summary
of provisions dealing with consent to adoption in the various jurisdictions.
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object to adoption without his consent, the courts seem unwilling
to dispense with such consent except for certain grave reasons which
have caused loss of custody. Furthermore, statutory provisions fre-
quently require that such decree be separate from divorce proceed-
ings, or that any deprivation of custody be based upon a specified
fault such as desertion or abandonment.14 Definition of the terms
"desertion" and "abandonment" are seldom found in the statutes and
courts are free to adopt their own definition of these terms.15
From an examination of statutes and cases, it is apparant that in
many jurisdictions the statutory provisions bearing upon consent
need a thorough redrafting in order that the meaning and purpose of
the legislature can be made clear.16 This need is well illustrated by
the situations arising under provisions of the Massachusetts statutes, 7
requiring consent of lawful parents to adoption with certain exceptions.
Under these provisions unfair results arose in cases where one parent
or a third party was awarded custody of a child with or without an
order for support against the other parent. For example one court
held that a child cannot be deserted by a parent who does not have
custody and who is not required by a court order to support the child. 8
These unfortunate results the legislature sought to correct by succes-
"' See CAL. Civ. CODE. sec. 224 (Deering, 1949); LL. REV. STAT., C. 4, sec. 2
(2-1) (1947) where action depriving of custody must be separate from divorce
proceeding; 3 IDAHO CODE ANN. sec. 16-1504 (1948); 4 REv. CoDEs OF MONT.
ANN. see. 61-130 (1947); 4 N-v. CoMP. LAWS, sec. 9478 (1929); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, sec. 44 (1941); 1 UTAH CODE ANN. see. 4 (1943). See excellent note
in 33 IOWA L. REv. 678 (1948) where it is pointed out that Iowa provides gen-
erally that the parent having the care and providing for the wants of the child has
the sole right of consent and where the effect of decisions has been to disregard
the distinctions between custody and adoption by treating custody in a divorce
action as practically absolute and irrevocable and making such award of custody
the basis for adoption. This view with the results achieved is distinctly a minority
position. In re Adoption of Karns, 236 Iowa 932, 20 N.W. 2d 474 (1945); In re
Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 931, 14 N.W. 2d 742 (1944).
SSee Woodson v. Lee, supra note 1, where the court approves Webster's defi-
nition of "abandonment" and quotes the meaning as "to relinquish or give up with
the intent of never again resuming or claiming one's rights or interests in; to give
up absolutely; to forsake entirely; to renounce utterly; to relinquish all connection
with or concern in," etc.
See also In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 Pac. 161 (1912) wherein the court
concluded that to constitute abandonment, there must be an intention to abandon,
either express or implied, from the conduct of the parent, respecting the child.
Accord, In re McCormick's Estate, 108 Wis. 234, 84 N.W. 148 (1900); Nugent v.
Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 Pac. 23 (1893).
" VEnNmR, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 345.
' II MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 210, sec. 2 (1932).
'See Zalis v. Ksypka, 315 Mass. 479, 53 N.E. 2d 104 (1944) where custody
had been awarded to a grandparent with no obligation of the father to provide
support and where the father's lack of consent prevented an adoption by the
grantparent; see also Broman v. Byrne, 322 Mass. 578, 78 N.E. 2d 616 (1948)
where a mother, who had custody of a child, and her second husband were not
allowed to adopt a child, even though the father provided no support. WAssE-iUAN,
AssENT To ADOPTON, 37 MAss. L. R. 56 (1952).
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sive amendments in 1945, 1951 and 1952, so that an absconding father
who had in reality deserted his child could not prevent an adoption
for the benefit of the child. By chapter 352 of 1952, which re-writes
G. L. Ted. Ed. Sec. 3, these unfair results seem to be greatly remedied
so that a natural parent who has lost all real interest in a child, by
failure to visit it or properly support it, cannot prevent an adoption
for the best interest of the child.19 It seems that the legislatures of
Massachusetts and other jurisdictions are really seeking to promote
adoptions for the welfare of the child without encountering interfer-
ence from parents who have truly forfeited a right to object to such
an adoption.
The whole problem with regard to the necessity for consent
seems to be one involving the balancing of the interests of the parents'
natural right to custody on the one hand, and the desirability of en-
couraging adoptions beneficial to children and society on the other.
The majority view, which requires consent and dispenses with it only
if there is conduct amounting to a voluntary forfeiture of parental
rights, clearly seems to be the proper view. This has been demon-
strated by difficulties encountered in Maryland, Iowa and the other
three states that do not require consent of the parents.20
Some decisions indicate that a child can be adopted against a
parent's consent principally for reasons relating to the welfare of the
child.21 Although welfare of a child seems to be the prime considera-
tion in cases involving custody, other factors as well must be taken
into account in adoption cases.22 This is true because an award of
'WAssmimAN, op. cit. supra, note 18 at 58. As re-written See. 3 provides
consent of the father shall not be required ". . . if he has wilfully deserted or
neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for such child for one year last
preceding the date of the petition, and the foregoing provision shall be applicable
to the father of the child and his consent shall not be required notwithstanding the
absence of a court decree ordering said father to pay for the support of said child,
and notwithstanding a court decree awarding custody of said child to its
mother.....
,o Vara, op. cit, supra note 5, at 340.
'In Adoption of Lagurnis, 186 Md. 97, 46 A. 2d 189 (1946), the court
reaches a correct result in permitting adoption over the protest of the natural
father because it seems that the father really neglected and abandoned his son by
not taking advantage of a right to have custody of his son at certain intervals and
by not attempting to see the child. The majority opinion, however, overemphasizes
the element of welfare of the child when it indicates that a child can be adopted
against the father's consent merely because of consideration of such welfare. An
excellent criticism of this case is contained in a note in 14 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 803(1947) where it is pointed out that both the majority and dissenting opinions use
the statutory standard of the welfare of the child, but they differ as to the weight
to be accorded the rights of the natural father.
'See note, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 788 (1947) where the author argues against
the holding of a number of courts insisting on calling the welfare of the child a
secondary issue in adoption cases and holding the natural right of the parents
paramount. The author concludes that there is no sound basis why consideration
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custody is essentially subject to change; while adoption creates a new
permanent relationship and dissolves the previous natural relationship
of parent and child. The natural parental relationship has always been
considered sacred and courts, constantly seeking to protect it, presume
that its preservation serves the best interests of the child except in
extraordinary cases. It is therefore reasonable that in adoption cases
the parent's feelings deserve greater weight than in cases involving
custody, and should be balanced against the considerations affecting
the child's welfare.
It has been pointed out that the political implications of allowing a
child to be taken from its parents without any consent are disturbing
because there is danger in making a child's welfare, as determined by
the state, the only consideration in adoption issues. 23
Under the accepted view that adoption statutes, in derogation of
the common law, must be strictly construed, most courts are not prone
to dispense with the requirement of consent except in clear cases.24
It has been observed that the trend is away from the type of statute in
effect in Maryland, under which parental consent to adoption is not
required. The Maryland type statute departs from the idea that
adoption is a contract by which a child is transferred from the natural
parent to the adopting parent, and introduces the element that
adoption is a means of remedying abuses of parental power, a function
which has traditionally been enforced by the states' power of parens
patria in proceedings different from adoption.25
This idea of remedying such abuses appears to be the theme be-
hind many statutes eliminating the necessity for consent where cus-
tody, guardianship, or parental rights have been removed from parents
by judicial decree. It is submitted that a less confusing approach to
the problem would be achieved by looking carefully to the reasons
for which custody has been denied to a parent before depriving him
of welfare should be confined to custody cases and says the holding that the
child's welfare cannot be considered in determining whether there has been
abandonment is unrealistic.
"See note, 14 U. of Chi. L. R. 303, 306 (1947).
' Thompson v. Bums, 337 I. App. 354, 86 N.E. 2d 155 (1949); In re Cozza,
163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161 (1912); In re McCormick's Estate, 106 Wis. 234, 84
N.W. 148 (1900). But see Seibert v. Seibert, 170 Iowa 561, 153 N.W. 160 (1915)
stating that a statute alowing a single parent having the lawful custody to consent
to adoption of the children of the marriage in case of divorce should be given a
liberal construction. The court says that in construing strictly or liberally suchconstruction would depend on who is making the contest, with strict construction
being applied when a non-consenting parent is making a contest of adoption, andwith liberal construction being given when a contest is by one to whom the chilis adopted. (The court held that here a wife merely left her husband temporarily
and so her consent was necessary under a statute permitting consent by the 
party
having custody during a separation.)
-
hSee note, 14 U of Cf. L. rv. 803, 305 (1947).
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of the right to give or withhold consent to the adoption of his child.
Statutes should be carefully worded to insure the right of the natural
parent, with or without present custody, not to have the permanent
parent-child relationship terminated by adoption by another with-
out his consent, unless that parent's neglect of duty to the child has
been flagrant.
P. JoANr SKAGGS
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY IN KENTUCKY
The law of manufacturers' liability in America has evolved a long
way from the 1842 English case of Winterbottom v. Wright1 to the so-
called "modem view" of the 1916 American case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.2 In order to attempt to classify Kentucky's present
position in such cases, a brief summary of this evolution would appear
to be in order. Winterbottom v. Wright is one of the most discussed,
but unfortunately oft-misunderstood cases in the law. In this case the
court held that one who had contracted with a buyer to keep a mail
coach in repair was not liable on the contract to a third party for in-
juries caused by disrepair. Certain dicta of the judges were so grossly
misunderstood, however, that a "general rule" of tort evolved from
the case that the original maker or seller of goods was not liable for
the damages caused by his negligence in manufacture, or failure to
inspect, to anyone except his immediate buyer.
As is usual, exceptions were made to the "general rule." Probably
the most significant of these were summarized in the 1903 case of
Huset v. 1. 1. Case Threshing Machine Co.3 as follows: 1) Where a
manufacturer does a negligent act, imminently dangerous to human
life in preparation of articles intended to preserve, destroy or effect
human life he is liable to third parties injured by his negligence.
2) Where an owner invites one to come onto land and use defective
instruments, he is liable for an injury caused by the defective condi-
tion of the instruments. 3) Where one sells or delivers an article which
he knows to be "imminently" dangerous, because defective, without
giving notice of its qualities, he is responsible to any person who suf-
fers an injury therefrom which might have been reasonably anticipated.
Later cases condensed the rule into liability for the negligent manu-
facture of articles "inherently" dangerous, in describing the first ex-
110 M. & W. 109, 152 E. R. 402 (1842).
2217 N.Y. 882, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'120 F. 865 (1903).
